We are in the era of so-called Globalisation 3.0.  While the dynamic force in Globalisation 1.0 was countries globalising, the dynamic force in Globalisation 2.0 was companies globalizing, the dynamic force in Globalisation 3.0 is the newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally (see Friedman, 2006, pp. 10).

The contemporaneous globalisation was led by General Electric and Texas Instruments back in the late 1980s and early ‘90s, with the outsourcing of information technology taking place and growing exponentially since then. We will see more of global outsourcing under way. Meanwhile Feeny, Lacity, and Willcocks (2005) point out that rather than address the challenges of poorly performing back-office operation, many companies are choosing to outsource some functions, or entire back offices to business-process outsourcing providers.

Offshoring began off as well following the opening of manufacturing factories by automobile makers like General Motor and Volks Wagon.  We will see more companies shifting their production overseas to countries like China and integrating it into their global supply chains. Parallel and with no exception to its counterparts, supply chaining emerges as a competitive advantage companies race to embrace. The columnist Friedman (2006, pp.170) raises a term ‘insourcing’, whereas UPS engineers come right inside one company; analyze its manufacturing, packaging, and delivery processes; and then design, redesign, and manage its whole global supply chain.   

Bardhan (2006) argues that eliminating the trade barriers and subsidies adopted by rich countries that discriminate against products produced in the Third World would significantly improve the material welfare of the poor in the Third World.  On the one hand, Bowles (ibid.) argues that globalisation does not constrain other redistributive policies that raise efficiency, so a redistribution of assets such as land may provide the poor with sufficient wealth to gain access to credit markets that were previously closed, enabling the poor to borrow and invest. On the other hand, in exploring the consequences of globalisation on the range of policy choices, Przeworski and Meseguer (2006) note that discontent with globalisation stems not from the absence of choice, but from the fact that none of the feasible choices provide full compensation for the victims of globalisation.   

As discussed by Archibugi and Immariono (2001), neither does the globalizing process provide advantages to all social groups and regions and it does not automatically reduce disparities. While some parts of the economy are at the core of the current trends, others have been marginalized.  Surveying the impact of globalisation on poverty in poor and middle-income countries, Bardhan (2006) concludes that most of the economic constraints facing the poor in low- and middle-income countries have little to do with globalisation and much to do with domestic institutions.